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ABSTRACT
Objectives: Pricing polices used in many countries are often
viewed in the United States as a mechanism of price con-
straint. Support for this contention has arisen from pricing
studies which demonstrate that the United States pays
higher prices for many pharmaceutical products. No study
to date, however, has examined the prices paid for pharma-
ceuticals that provide signiﬁcant health gain, which might
be expected to be lower where price constraints were oper-
ating. This study aimed to examine prices paid by federal
government programs and agencies in Australia and the
United States for pharmaceutical products that provide sig-
niﬁcant health gain.
Methods: Products identiﬁed by the US Food and Drug
Administration and the Canadian Patented Medicines Prices
Review Board as likely to confer signiﬁcant health gains
between 1999 and 2004 were identiﬁed. Australian and US
federal government prices ($US) and US average manufac-
turer prices (AMP), which do not include discounts or
rebates, during the second quarter of 2006 were compared.
Results: Of 22 products for which comparisons were pos-
sible, Australian prices were higher than the US Federal
Supply Schedule (FSS) prices for 14 (64%) products. When
compared with AMP, Australian prices were higher for eight
of the 22 products. Overall, Australian prices were higher on
average by 4.2% when compared with the FSS and lower by
14.4% when compared with the AMP.
Conclusion: These results suggest that Australian prices for
medicines representing signiﬁcant advances in therapy are
similar to those paid under key US programs despite funda-
mental differences in policy contexts.
Keywords: Australia, innovation, pharmaceutical prices,
trade agreements, United States.
Introduction
In setting its trade negotiation agenda in 2002, the
United States Congress directed the US Trade Repre-
sentative to seek “the elimination of government mea-
sures such as price controls and reference pricing
which deny full market access for United States prod-
ucts” in markets abroad [1]. The US trade agenda
reﬂected a view that remains widely held in the United
States—that pharmaceutical reimbursement and
pricing policies in Australia and other OECD countries
constitute technical barriers to trade that suppress
prices, limit returns to industry, place an unfair cost
burden on US consumers, and do not adequately
recognize or “reward” innovation. Furthermore, it is
claimed that by constraining prices to below the
market rate of return, countries like Australia that
impose “price controls” are “free-riding” on the R&D
investment of US-based companies and undermining
their capacity to discover and develop future advances
in therapy [2–4].
Although this viewpoint is not universal [5], wide-
spread concern nevertheless exists about the need to
maintain adequate incentives to ensure future innova-
tion in pharmaceutical R&D. The text of the Australia
US Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in
January 2005, captures this. One of the several Agreed
Principles which precede the operative paragraphs in
the Annex on Pharmaceuticals is “the need to recog-
nize the value of innovative pharmaceuticals through
the operation of competitive markets or by adopting or
maintaining procedures that appropriately value the
objectively demonstrated therapeutic signiﬁcance of a
pharmaceutical” [6].
In light of this Agreed Principle, we aimed to assess
the prices that the Australian and US Governments
currently pay for “innovative” pharmaceu-
ticals—innovative in that they provide signiﬁcant
health gain over the products that precede them.
In Australia, the Federal Government does not
directly purchase medicines, but operates a compre-
hensive national prescription drug reimbursement
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program known as the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts
Scheme (PBS). The program has been in place for more
than 50 years. Initially the addition of new drugs to the
formulary was considered primarily on the basis of
clinical need; however, since the early 1990s the rel-
evant legislation has required that when new medicines
are proposed for subsidy, they must be considered on
the basis of an assessment of comparative effectiveness
and comparative cost-effectiveness against existing
therapies. The PBS and the processes for evaluation
and decision-making have been described in detail
elsewhere [7,8].
The US market, being noncentralized, reﬂects a
great diversity of pricing mechanisms for pharmaceu-
ticals. The US federal government procurement pro-
cesses are used to provide medicines for veterans,
military personnel, and indigenous populations, and
other federal government programs may procure medi-
cines at federal government prices. Both the US and
Australian government medicine prices are available in
the public domain.
Previous studies comparing medicine prices interna-
tionally have examined the prices of new (but not
necessarily innovative) medicines [9] or have limited
analyses to a sample set of medicines reﬂective of the
types of products available on the market [10,11].
Many new pharmaceutical products introduced to the
market are line extensions or are similar to existing
products and thus not truly innovative in terms of
providing health gain [12]. The US Department of
Commerce study of pharmaceutical price controls in
OECD countries published in late 2004 presented
price comparisons for a data set comprising the 54
“top-selling” medicines in the United States [4].
Although the report states that the analysis “focused
speciﬁcally on innovative pharmaceuticals,” the
patents on at least 13 of the medicines in the data set
had expired in one or both jurisdictions at the time of
the analysis.
We have not located a published study that has
focused speciﬁcally on the pricing of innovative phar-
maceuticals using an objective deﬁnition of innovation
that considers health gain. The aim of this study was to
compare the current prices (second quarter of 2006)
paid by the Australian and US Governments of inno-
vative medicines which provide substantial therapeutic
advances over existing treatments.
Method
Data Set of Innovative Medicines
Innovative medicines that represent therapeutic
advances over existing therapies were identiﬁed using
deﬁnitions used by the Canadian Patented Medicines
Prices Review Board (PMPRB) and the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). The PMPRB designates
all newly registered pharmaceutical products as either
innovative, line extensions, or similar to existing thera-
pies marketed in Canada. An innovative product is
deﬁned as “the ﬁrst drug product to treat effectively a
particular illness or to provide a substantial improve-
ment over existing drug products.” All products des-
ignated as innovative between 1999 and 2004 were
identiﬁed from PMPRB annual reports 2000 to 2004
[13]. Between 1999 and 2004, 11 pharmaceutical
products (8 distinct molecular entities or combina-
tions) were deemed to be innovative.
The FDA provides fast-track review of new drugs or
biologics that are intended to treat serious or life-
threatening conditions and that demonstrate the
potential to address unmet medical needs. All products
listed as having undergone fast-track review since
1999 were identiﬁed from the FDA web site [14].
Between 1999 and 2004, there were 40 pharmaceuti-
cal products (35 distinct molecular entities or combi-
nations) in this category.
A consolidated list of 51 products was developed
based on the two data sources. For the purposes of this
pricing comparison, where a molecular entity was
listed as two different products, the product with the
same package size and strength was chosen for the
analysis, or where both were the same, the highest
strength product chosen. Pack sizes were standardized
per unit cost. Products were excluded from the list if
they were not registered in Australia. Three combina-
tion products were excluded because they were not
packaged in the same combination in Australia and the
United States, and a vaccine was also excluded as
vaccines are generally not funded by the PBS in Aus-
tralia. Two products were orphan drugs and not yet
marketed in Australia, while a further nine were not
yet PBS listed. This left 22 products for which price
comparisons were possible.
Prices
The US prices for pharmaceutical products were
obtained from the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) Con-
solidated FSS, Big 4, and Restricted FSS (VA-Only)
Prices published by the US Department of Veterans
Affairs, Pharmacy Beneﬁt Management, Strategic
Healthcare Group [15]. Four major government
agencies (the Veterans Administration, Department
of Defense, Public Health Service, and Coast
Guard—known as the Big 4) may purchase pharma-
ceuticals at FSS prices.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are required to
report to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) their
average and lowest prices charged to all nonfederal
customers. Based on these disclosed prices, the VA then
negotiates with pharmaceutical manufacturers a price
which is available to all government agencies that
directly procure pharmaceuticals. FSS prices must not
exceed the federal ceiling price (FCP), where FCP is
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76% of the non-federal average manufacturer price
(refer to Table 1 for an explanation of terms).
A separate discount drug program operates within
the FSS framework for the Big 4. A cap is applied to
the prices manufacturers may charge based on a
measure of average manufacturer prices and inﬂation.
This cap is deﬁned in the Veterans Health Care Act of
1992. The price to a Big 4 purchaser for a brand-name
drug is the lower of the FSS or the cap. About one-
third of products have both FSS and Big 4 prices.
We also examined prices paid by the US Govern-
ment under the Medicare Part B program. Payments
for Medicare Part B medicines reﬂect the average sales
price (ASP) (inclusive of rebates and discounts) plus
6%.
In addition, we compared prices with wholesale
acquisition cost (WAC), which we estimated from the
average wholesale price (AWP), using a 25% mark-up
on the WAC price [15,16]. WAC is “the manufactur-
er’s list price for the drug or biological to wholesalers
or direct purchasers in the United States, not including
prompt pay or other discounts, rebates or reductions
in price” [17].
The FSS prices are updated daily to the VA web site
and the current price list at May 3, 2006 was used.
Prices were extracted for the FSS, Restricted FSS, and
Big 4 [15]. ASP prices reﬂective of the second quarter
of 2006 were obtained from the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) web site [18]. WAC prices
were estimated from AWP prices obtained from the
2006 Red Book [19].
Australian prices for pharmaceutical products were
sourced from the Schedule of Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts,
April 2006 edition [20]. Australian prices were con-
verted to US dollars using the live mid-market rates on
May 3, 2006 as reported on http://www.xe.com uni-
versal currency converter (AUD 1.00 = USD 0.7683)
[21] and using GDP purchasing power parity estimates
for 2005 (United States = 1.0, Australia = 1.38) [22].
Results
Of the 22 innovative products for which price com-
parisons were possible, Australian PBS ex manufac-
turer prices were generally similar to US prices. When
considering FSS prices, Australian prices were higher
for 12 products, with two other products higher, but
within 5% of the FSS price (Table 2). For two prod-
ucts, Australian prices were midway between Big 4 and
FSS prices. For the 14 products where Australian
prices were highest, the average difference was 30%,
and this rose to 52% when compared with Big 4
prices. For the six products where Australian prices
were lowest, they were on average, 50% lower than
the FSS price.
When compared with WAC prices, a different result
was observed with Australian prices higher for seven
of the 22 products and, higher, but within 5% of the
WAC for one further product. Where Australian prices
were higher, they were on average 24% higher, but
where prices were lower they were on average 36%
lower.
Table 1 Deﬁnition of pricing terms used in the United States [32]
Term Deﬁnition
Average Wholesale Price (AWP) Publicly available, suggested list price for sales of a drug by a wholesaler to a pharmacy or other provider.
Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) The average price paid to a manufacturer for drugs distributed through retail and mail-order pharmacies.
Does not include rebates paid by the manufacturer to third party payers.This price excludes sales to direct
federal purchasers.
Non-Federal Average Manufacturer
Price (Non-FAMP)
The average price paid to the manufacturer by wholesalers (or others who purchase directly from the
manufacturer) for drugs distributed to nonfederal purchasers, taking into account any cash discounts or
similar price reductions given to those purchasers but not taking into account any prices paid by the
federal government.The non-FAMP is used to calculate the maximum price that manufacturers can charge
the “Big 4”—the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, the Department of Defence, the Public Health Service and
the Coastguard.
Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) The Department of Veteran’s Affairs negotiates prices with manufacturers based on the prices that
manufacturers charge their most-favored commercial customers under comparable terms and conditions.
All direct federal purchasers may purchase drugs at the prices listed on the FSS.
Federal Ceiling Price (FCP) The maximum price that manufacturer can charge the Big 4 for brand-name drugs. In the ﬁrst year of an FSS
contract, the FCP equals 76% of the previous ﬁscal year’s non-FAMP minus an additional discount if the
non-FAMP rises faster than inﬂation. In subsequent years of a multiyear contract, the FCP also cannot
exceed the previous year’s FSS price, increased by inﬂation.
Big 4 Price Under the FCP program, the Big 4 purchases brand- name drugs at prices that cannot exceed the FCP.About
two-thirds of the brand-name products on the FSS have one FSS price (which cannot exceed the FCP).The
remaining one-third of the brand-name drug products have both an FSS price, offered to all non-Big 4
purchasers, and an FSS Big 4 price, available to the Big 4 only.
VA Average Price The VA average price for a drug may be lower than the price available to the Big 4 because VA negotiates
further price reductions using its preferred formulary.The VA average price takes into account all the
various pricing schedules and contracts under which VA purchases drugs, and includes discounts from the
prime vendor that average about 3% of the contract price in 2003, or about 1.4% of the AWP.
DoD Military Treatment Facility
(MTF) Average Price
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) MTF average price for a drug may be lower than the price available to
the Big 4 as DoD negotiates further price reductions using its preferred formularies.The MTF average price
takes into account all the various pricing schedules and contracts under which DoD purchases drugs.
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Overall, Australian prices were higher on average
by 4.2% when compared with the FSS and lower by
14.4% when compared with the WAC.
Discussion
This study provides a direct comparison of pharma-
ceutical prices in Australia and the United States for
innovative products providing health gain. Australian
prices were higher than FSS prices in the majority of
examples, but lower than WAC, with on average Aus-
tralian prices being 4.2% higher than FSS and 14.4%
lower than WAC.
The WAC does not take into account any discounts
or rebates available to purchasers. Discounts and
rebates averaging 8% to 11% have been used in other
pricing studies [4], which, if applied in this study,
would indicate that Australian prices may be equiva-
lent to average US prices. Although it could be argued
that discounts and rebates do not generally apply to
branded products, for 12 of the 22 products identiﬁed
Big 4 prices were listed in addition to FSS and in these
cases Big 4 prices were on average 20% lower than
FSS. Even lower prices are reported for the few prod-
ucts listed as VA-FSS, for example, peginterferon alpha
2A has a listed VA-FSS price that is 53% of the FSS and
Big 4 listed price. This suggests that discounts and
rebates are likely to be available to large institutional
purchasers of these products.
The US prices reported in this study are likely to be
indicative of the wider price paid across the United
States as the WACs were calculated from AWPs which
apply to a market comprising more than 200 million
people [16]. Although it could be argued that US FSS
prices are not reﬂective of all US prices, the FSS prices
are accessible by the Department of Defense, Indian
Health Service, Coast Guard and Veterans Administra-
tion, which collectively cover approximately 15
million beneﬁciaries in 2005 [23–25]. The Australian
PBS provides coverage for all Australian resid-
ents—approximately 20 million people [26]. Thus,
even the comparison with FSS prices reﬂects prices
paid in markets of similar magnitude.
The results of this study also demonstrate how the
lack of transparency of US prices serves to obscure
accurate price comparisons between countries. The
FSS is supposedly 76% of the AMP; however, it was
observed in this study that the FSS was not always
76% of the ASP, the latter which is used for Medicare
Part B prices and which is supposed to be the same as
the AMP (inclusive of discounts). For four of the 11
products where comparisons were possible, the FSS
was more than 80% of the ASP and in two instances
the prices were effectively equivalent. Thus, even prices
used by US government agencies are inconsistent.
We calculated the WAC from the AWP, using an
estimated mark-up of 25% on the WAC based on the
Health Care Financing Administration 2001 report,
which suggests wholesaler mark-ups of between 20%
and 25% [16]. We used the 25% estimate which we
acknowledge may favor the comparison toward Aus-
tralia; however, a 2006 court ruling found that pub-
lished AWP prices were inﬂated by 4% because of
consistent application of the 25% mark-up [27], sug-
gesting our approach was unlikely to bias our esti-
mates. Reports of the court ruling also suggest that
the pharmaceutical industry itself acknowledge that
the AWP is an overestimate of actual US prices as
evidenced by this quote: “Today’s ruling roundly
rejects the defendants’ assertions that while the data
was termed ‘average wholesale price’, Congress and
others responsible for setting reimbursements inher-
ently understood that the ﬁgures were not accurate,
and had little reﬂection on the actual AWP, but rather
was a benchmark used for negotiation purposes”
[28].
A step toward greater price transparency in the
United States is under way. Among the provisions of
the Deﬁcit Reduction Act of 2005, signed by President
Bush in February 8, 2006, are changes in the calcula-
tion and reporting of drug pricing data to the CMS.
Beginning in 2007, manufacturers will be required to
report AMP and “best price” to CMS on a monthly
basis, and CMS will be required to provide AMP infor-
mation to state agencies and post reported AMPs on a
web site accessible to the public. Previously, AMP data
were provided to CMS on a conﬁdential basis and
could not be disclosed by the agency [28]. This may
mean that future pricing studies will be able to better
accurately reﬂect US prices.
This study is the ﬁrst to focus on the prices of
medicines considered innovative in terms of therapeu-
tic advances. Previous studies have identiﬁed innova-
tive products as those drugs under patent with no
generic equivalents, and have reported US prices 1.8 to
2 times of those in Australia [4,9,11], with even larger
differences noted when all products were considered
[9,11]. Unlike these previous studies, our results
suggest a much smaller price difference when products
which offer health gain are considered, with at best the
US prices being 14% higher based on the average
WAC, which is not inclusive of discounts and rebates,
and alternatively lower when FSS prices are consid-
ered. The difference between our ﬁndings and those of
previous studies may indicate that innovation where
there is signiﬁcant health gain is valued differently in
Australia, but additional research would be required to
conﬁrm this.
The 2004 US Department of Commerce report [4]
considered that US pharmaceutical prices, which are
set in a market that does not have national pricing
mechanisms, reﬂect the price of pharmaceuticals in an
unregulated market. The argument often put forward
in studies which have found that US prices are higher
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than that in other countries where there are national
pricing mechanisms, is that it is the national policy
or pricing framework that has “suppressed” prices
[4,9,11]. If this assumption were true, it might be
reasonable to consider it would be most obvious where
products were new and offered signiﬁcant health gain
with such products achieving higher prices in the US
market because of their increased market value. Our
results, however, do not support this assumption.
In this study, we used the deﬁnitions of innovation
as applied by either the PMPRB or the Fast Track
Program of the FDA. Neither the PMPRB nor the FDA
provide detail on their respective rationales for desig-
nating products as innovative or worthy of fast-
tracking, so it is not possible to determine whether the
products for which Australian prices were lower have
in some way been valued differently to other products
on the list. In the Australian context, the reasons for
recommending or rejecting medicines for listing on the
PBS are detailed in Public Summary Documents (PSD)
posted on the web site of the Department of Health
and Ageing [29]. The evaluation is comparative, so
each PSD provides an explicit interpretation of a
drug’s therapeutic signiﬁcance relative to the therapy
most likely to be replaced in practice.
Although the appropriate deﬁnition of an “innova-
tive” pharmaceutical may be arguable, there is no stan-
dard deﬁnition. What is clear is that not all new
products that come to market are considered innova-
tive when health gain or therapeutic advance is con-
sidered. A study assessing medicines registered in
Europe between 1995 and 2003 found only 32% pro-
vided an important therapeutic innovation; however,
this study did not provide an explicit list of which
medicines were deemed innovative [12]. It is acknowl-
edged that an understanding of the extent of the thera-
peutic advance offered by a new drug may change over
time as more data come to light postmarket. Prices are
generally set or negotiated at the time a product is ﬁrst
registered and considered for reimbursement. Thus, we
believe, the deﬁnition of innovative as used by the FDA
and Canadian PMPRB is the most appropriate to use
for this type of study as it most closely reﬂects the
understanding of innovative at the time of pricing and
provides an objective standard.
The ﬁnding that Australian prices were similar to
US prices for innovative medicines that provide signiﬁ-
cant health gain is consistent with recent reports that
prices for biologics in Europe and Japan exceed those
in the United States [30]. Japanese prices have been
reported to average 120% of the prices in the United
States, and European prices 105%, with the average
for France and Germany as high as 113% [30]. This
has been suggested to reﬂect the European and Japa-
nese authorities’ willingness to approve high prices
for therapies that represent substantive therapeutic
advances over older treatments [30].
Comparative cost-effectiveness assessment as a pre-
requisite for formulary listing has been mandatory in
Australia since 1993, thus all products considered in
this study were explicitly considered for subsidy on
this basis. The application of cost-effectiveness assess-
ment as a prerequisite for formulary listing has been
criticized as a form of price control [31]. Nevertheless,
from our analysis it would appear that prices in Aus-
tralia for innovative medicines that are considered to
offer signiﬁcant therapeutic advances are not dissimilar
to those in the United States and thus that the appli-
cation of the “fourth hurdle” does not signiﬁcantly
impact the prices of drugs that represent substantive
therapeutic advances.
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